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The effectiveness of Japanese interventions over the past decade depended in large part 
on the frequency and size of the transactions.  Prior to June 1995, Japanese interventions 
only had value as a forecast that the previous day’s yen appreciation or depreciation 
would moderate during the current day.  After June 1995, Japanese purchases of dollars 
had value as a forecast that the yen would depreciate.  Probit analysis confirms that large, 
infrequent interventions, which characterized the later period, had a higher likelihood of 
success than small, frequent interventions. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Since the early 1990s, the monetary authorities of the major industrialized 
countries, with one notable exception, have greatly curtailed their foreign-exchange 
interventions.  That exception has been Japan, where the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
using the Bank of Japan as its agent, has continued to intervene frequently—and at times 
massively—in foreign-exchange markets.  Although press reports of Japanese 
interventions have often been available, and although the MoF has sometimes announced 
such operations, Japanese authorities did not release actual data until recently.   
  This paper analyzes the short-term effectiveness of Japanese exchange-market 
operations using the official Japanese intervention data.  We apply a technique developed 
in Hendriksson and Merton (1981) and Merton (1981) and used in Leahy (1995) and 
Humpage (1999, 2000) to analyze U.S. interventions.  This procedure allows us to 
determine if the observe number of successful interventions exceeds the amount that 
would randomly occur given the martingale nature of exchange-rate changes.  As such, 
the technique is not an investigation of any particular channel through which intervention 
might operate.  Nevertheless, this approach is compatible with the signaling channel.   
  We show that official Japanese purchases of U.S. dollars after June 14, 1995, 
were highly successful at predicting a near-term yen depreciation.  (The very few sales of 
dollars after that date were not effective by most standards.)  Prior to June 1995, official 
Japanese interventions only had value as a forecast that recent yen movements would 
moderate, but not reverse (i.e., leaning against the wind).  Our probit regressions 
indicated that the MoF could increase the probability of success by undertaking large, but 
infrequent interventions.  We also find some evidence that coordinated interventions had 
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a higher that expected success rate, but because of the small number of coordinated 
interventions in our sample, we are unable to derive strong inferences about the 
importance of joint activities.   
  This paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 discusses the theoretical connections 
between official intervention and exchange rates.  Section 3 offers basic summary 
statistics for the official Japanese intervention data.  Section 4 explains our test procedure 
and presents our success criteria.  Section 5 evaluates the success counts.  Section 6 
shows the results of probit regression on our general success criteria.  Section 7 
summarizes our results and compares them with relevant recent papers.   
2.  Channels of Intervention Effectiveness 
  The traditional approach to the analysis of the effectiveness of sterilized 
intervention has focused on two avenues of influence, the signaling or expectations 
channel and the portfolio-balance channel.  Empirical evidence in favor of a portfolio-
balance channel is generally weak.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993) is a notable 
exception.  The signaling channel, however, has received a bit more support.  According 
to the signaling channel, central bank can use sterilized foreign exchange intervention to 
transmit private information to the market (see Baillie, Humpage, Osterberg, 2000).  
  Recently, economists have proposed new channels of influence.  One is related to 
the well-known Keynesian beauty contest, in which individuals vote on the contestant 
that they think is most likely to win, instead of the most beautiful entrant (see Keynes, 
1936).  In the same vein, an exchange rate could stay misaligned because of bandwagon 
effects or collective action problems (see Ramaswamy and Samiei, 2000, and Sarno and 
Taylor, 2001.)  Under such circumstances, even if most traders felt that the current level 
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of an exchange rate was inappropriate, no one would be willing to be first to buy or sell 
the currency.  No one would want to make the first move in a game theoretic common 
knowledge setting.  The behavior of each trader in this setting would be individually 
rational, and the misalignment of the exchange rate could persist.  Sterilized intervention 
might provide an exit from this misalignment by offering an opportunity for traders to 
coordinate toward the “correct” equilibrium rate.  This realignment could occur if central 
bank intervention provided a new focal point for the correct exchange rate—a variant of 
the signaling channel—or if intervention, particularly repeated intervention, reduced 
traders’ perceived risks in making the first move away from the current equilibrium.   
  Another potential channel of intervention effectiveness at very short horizons is 
simple through the immediate impact of the order flow on price.  Lyons (2001) discusses 
this channel in the context of secret intervention operations, where market makers treat 
the appearance of order flow from a central bank as they would any other sizable order.  
They see the order flow as potentially revealing private information held by other 
counterparties.  More generally, they can regard order flow as a reflection of changing 
parameters among other market participants, such as a shift in the market’s attitude 
toward risk.  Either way observing the order flow will lead the market makers to adjust 
their prices.   
  Whether secret or not, a sizeable central bank intervention would probably affect 
the exchange rate, at least temporarily, even if market makers did not believe that it 
revealed private information or changing market parameters.  Market makers adjust their 
prices to protect themselves against the risk of holding a sizeable position for a period of 
time.  As an intervention pushes the inventory position of market makers further and 
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further away from neutrality, the compensation that they require grows, and the exchange 
rate movement increases.  Because of this inventory effect, central bank interventions that 
are large enough, all other things equal, should result in an almost mechanical adjustment 
in exchange rates, at least temporarily.  The size of this adjustment depends on the 
market’s liquidity.   
  Being able to move the exchange rate temporarily by such “brute force” may have 
more permanent effects.  One possibility is that, absent a commonly perceived 
equilibrium exchange rate, market participants may view the new level of the exchange 
rate as a starting point for a random walk.  Moreover, pushing the exchange rate even 
temporarily beyond a certain level may force a number of market participants to liquidate 
losing positions, reinforcing the central bank’s actions. (see Osler, 2003)    
3.  Japanese Intervention   
  According to official Ministry of Finance data, Japan undertook frequent and 
massive foreign-exchange-market interventions during the 1990s, usually in a manner 
consistent with promoting a yen depreciation or limiting a yen appreciation (figure 1).  
Between May 13, 1991, and December 31, 2002, Japanese monetary authorities 
intervened on 215 occasions against U.S. dollars; 85% of these transactions involved 
official purchases of dollars (see table 1).  The intervention amounts ranged from a $25 
million (equivalent) purchase of yen on August 11, 1992, to an extremely large $20.4 
billion (equivalent) purchase of yen on April 10, 1998.  The median amount of a Japanese 
intervention was $493 million, but the median dollar purchase ($504 million) was more 
than twice as large as the median dollar sales ($223 million).  As table 1 indicates, the 
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Japanese operations were substantially greater than the corresponding U.S. interventions 
against yen over this period.   
The Japanese transactions generally were not sporadic, but occurred in fairly 
persistent strings of activity punctuated with substantial periods of no action.  Out of the 
215 interventions, for example, Japan undertook 59 (only 27%) after a lag of at least 4 
business days from the previous intervention.  Often, as figure 1 indicates, the lag was 
very long.  The other interventions occurred in closer proximity of each other.   
On 22 occasions, the United States joined with Japan in a coordinated 
intervention effort.  Unlike Japanese interventions, which occurred in clumps, the U.S. 
interventions were usually isolated events.  Almost all of these coordinated efforts were 
yen sales.   
Tables 2 and 3 present the same data as table 1, but for the two subperiods: March 
19, 1991, to June 14, 1995, and June 15, 1995, to December 31, 2002 (see Ito, 2002).  
June 15, 1995, was the first intervention operation under Dr. Sakakibara, the new 
Director General of the MoF’s International Finance Division.  These two episodes differ 
in three important respects that appear to have some bearing on the success of the 
operations.  First, interventions after June 15, 1995, were substantially larger than before 
that date.  Second, although substantially larger in size, interventions in the second period 
occurred far less frequently (2.6% of the days) than in the first period (15.4% of the 
days).  Third, the Japanese monetary authorities were less likely to undertake long strings 
of intervention in the second period.  Out of the 50 interventions after June 15, 1995, 
54% took place after a lag of at least 4 business days.  Out of the 165 interventions before 
that date, only 19% followed a lag of at least 4 business days.   
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4.  Success Criteria 
  We evaluate the success of Japanese interventions using four specific criteria and 
an aggregate criterion that incorporates the first four.  We count the number of successes 
according to each criterion and evaluate them under the assumption that the success count 
is a hypergeometric random variable.  The approach follows a test that Hendriksson and 
Merton (1981) and Merton (1981) developed to evaluate the performance of investment 
managers.  Leahy (1995) applied this procedure to an analysis of U.S. profits from 
intervention, and Humpage (1999, 2000) used it to analyze the success of U.S. 
interventions.   
  The test assumes that Japanese monetary authorities do not directly affect 
underlying exchange-rate fundamentals when they intervene.  Prior to March 18, 2001, 
the Bank of Japan conducted monetary policy with an overnight interest-rate target, a 
procedure that requires them to automatically sterilize any interventions that altered the 
supply of reserves in breach of the target.  To be sure, monetary authorities could alter a 
target interest rate to achieve an exchange-rate objective, but then any accompanying 
interventions may be entirely superfluous.
1  After March 18, the Bank of Japan operated 
with a reserve (current-account) target, but the Bank continued to sterilize the Ministry of 
Finance’s interventions in the sense of not allowing interventions to directly affect 
current-account balances.
2   
  Although our methodology merely investigates the “randomness” of intervention 
successes, it provides a necessary condition by which to judge whether Japanese 
interventions might operate through a signaling, or expectations, channel.  When a 
monetary authority takes an open position in a foreign currency, it has—like any 
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speculator—an expectation about the chances for an imminent changes in that currency.  
If the monetary authority’s success rate is significantly higher than random, its 
intervention will have value as a forecast of near-term exchange-rate movements.  
Knowledge that the monetary authority is intervening will cause private traders to alter 
their prior estimates of the distribution of exchange-rate changes.   
  Testing the forecast value of private speculators involves a search for profitable 
trading strategies, but monetary authorities do not generally intervene for profit.  The 
success criteria defined below offer reasonable alternatives.  These definitions may not 
encompass all possibilities, but each is readily verifiable.
3  The Hendriksson and Merton 
(1981) test requires us to consider purchases and sales of foreign exchange separately.   
4.1.  Appreciate or depreciate the yen.   
  The first success criterion presumes that when a monetary authority buys or sells 
yen against dollars, they expect the yen to immediately appreciate or depreciate, as the 
case may be, against the U.S. dollar.  Accordingly, the first success criterion for official 
sales of yen against dollars is:    
1)   


 > ∆ >
=
  otherwise.   0






The corresponding criterion for official purchases of Japanese yen is:    
2)   


 < ∆ <
=
  otherwise.   0






 In  these  expressions,  It refers to intervention of day t with positive and negative 
values indicating sales or purchases of Japanese yen, respectively.  The exchange-rate 
change, ∆St, is measured as the difference between today’s closing rate and yesterday’s 
closing rate in the New York market.  The exchange-rate change brackets each U.S. and 
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Japanese intervention, irrespective of whether they take place in the New York or Tokyo 
markets.  Chang and Taylor (1998), Cheung and Chinn (2001), Dominguez (2003), 
among others, suggest that exchange markets respond to interventions within minutes or 
hours, not days.     
4.2.  Reversing the direction of the exchange-rate movement.   
  Our second and more stringent success criterion assumes that when monetary 
authorities intervene, they expect the yen to reverse its recent appreciation or 
depreciation.  Accordingly, an intervention sale of Japanese yen is successful if:   
3)   


 < ∆ > ∆ >
=
−
  otherwise.   0
  and   , 0   and   , 0   and   , 0   if    1
2




An intervention purchase of Japanese yen is successful if:  
4)   


 > ∆ < ∆ <
=
−
   otherwise.   0
  and   , 0   and   , 0   and   , 0   if    1
2




4.3.  Moderate exchange-rate movements 
Empirical estimates of intervention reaction function typically report that monetary 
authorities attempt to smooth exchange-rate movements or lean against the wind (e.g., 
Edison 1993, Almekinders 1995).  Our third success criterion is compatible with this 
evidence.  We assume that monetary authorities take a position in the foreign-exchange 
market when they expect that a recent appreciation or depreciation has proceed too 
quickly, will subsequently slow, but will not reverse itself.  Accordingly,  
5)   


 < < ∆ ∆ > ∆ >
=
− −
   otherwise.   0
  and   , 0   and   , 0   and   , S   and   , 0   if    1
3
1 1 t t t t t
t
∆S S S I
s W
6)   


 > ∆ > ∆ ∆ < ∆ <
=
− −
   otherwise.   0
  and   , 0   and   , 0   and   ,   and   , 0   if    1
3
1 1 t t t t t
t
S S S S I
b W
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4.4.  Accentuating exchange-rate movements 
  Our final individual success criterion assumes that the monetary authorities sell or 
purchase yen against dollars when they believe that a recent yen depreciation or 
appreciation, as the case may be, will proceed at a faster clip (leaning with the wind). 
Reflecting this criterion:   
7)   


 > ∆ ∆ > ∆ >
=
− −
   otherwise.   0
  and   , 0   and   ,   and   , 0   if    1
4
1 1 t t t t
t
S S S I
s W
8)   


 < ∆ ∆ < ∆ <
=
− −
   otherwise.   0
  and   , 0   and   ,   and   , 0   if    1
4
1 1 t t t t
t
S S S I
b W
3.5.  A general success criteria 
The following general success criteria aggregates all of the previous criteria:   
9)   


 ∆ > ∆ > ∆ >
=
−
   otherwise.   0
   and   , or    , 0   and   , 0   if    1
5
1 t t t t
t
S S S I
s W
10)   


 ∆ < ∆ < ∆ <
=
−
   otherwise.   0
   and   , or    , 0   and   , 0   if    1
5
1 t t t t
t
S S S I
b W
We will use these general success criteria primarily in sections 6.    
  A monetary authority, unlike a private speculator, hopes to influence the market 
by conveying any or all of these exchange-rate expectations to the private sector.  
Exchange markets, however, will regard the monetary authority as having positive 
forecast value only if their interventions are highly accurate predictors of these exchange-
rate patterns.   
5.  Forecast Value 
  Given the martingale nature of exchange-rate changes, one would expect to 
observe a fairly high number of intervention successes merely by chance.  To have 
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forecast value, the frequency with which a particular exchange-rate pattern coincides with 
interventions—a success—must significantly exceed the frequency with which it occurs 
irrespective of any interventions.  If the yen appreciates against the dollar on 50 percent 
of the trading days, then one should not be surprise to find that 50 percent of all official 
dollar sales are associated with yen appreciations.   
  We evaluate the probability of observing a specific number of successes under the 
assumption that their occurrence is a hypergeometric random variable.  The 
hypergeometric distribution does not require individual events to be independent and 
does not depend on the presumed probability of an individual success.  Our null 
hypothesis states that the actual number of successes equals the expected number of 
successes.  If the probability of observing a greater number of successes than we actually 
found is 5 percent or less, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that Japanese 
monetary authorities have forecast value.
4   
  Our results appear in table 4 (March 19, 1991, to December 31, 2002), table 5 
(March 19, 1991, to June 14, 1995) and table 6 (June 15, 1995, to December 31, 2002).  
The first column of each table lists the success criteria for all Japanese interventions in 
the top half and for coordinated interventions in the bottom half.  The second column 
presents a count of the total intervention by each monetary authority during the sample 
period.  The Japanese bought dollars on 182 days and sold dollars on 33 occasions over 
the sample period.  The United States sold yen on only 18 days and purchased yen on 
only 4 days in concert with Japan.  Column 3 lists the number of interventions that were 
successful according to each of the specific criterion, while column 4 records those 
successes as a percentage of the total interventions.  Of the 182 Japanese purchases of 
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dollars in the entire sample (table 4), for example, 87 or 47.8% were associated with a 
dollar appreciation against the yen.   
  The next two columns in table 4, 5, and 6 are labeled virtual successes and refer 
to exchange-rate movements independent of intervention.  Column 5 records the number 
of times that the exchange rate moved in conformity with the corresponding success 
criterion whether or not intervention took place.  Between March 19, 1991, and 
December 31, 2000, for example, the dollar appreciated on 1437 days, these include days 
with and without official interventions (see table 4).  Column 6 expresses the data in 
column 5 as a percentage of the total observations in the relevant sample period.  As one 
might expect, the dollar appreciated approximately one-half of the time.   
The next three columns relate to the hypergeometric distribution.  Columns 7 and 
8 show the expected number of success and their standard deviation.  The last column 
shows the probabilities associated with the observed number of success.   
5.1. Table 4 (March 19, 1991, to December 31, 2002) 
Three aspects of table 4 stand out: 1) Japanese interventions have positive forecast 
value with respect to signaling that the yen’s recent appreciation or depreciation would 
moderate.  2) The frequent and large Japanese purchase of dollars had value as a forecast 
that a yen appreciation would reverse.  3) The count of successful coordinated 
intervention typically exceeds the expected number, but the p-value is usually large.  We 
discuss each finding in turn.   
Over our sample of 2971 business days, we would expect to randomly find 19 
official yen sales out of 182 such transactions associated with moderating yen 
appreciations.  Similarly, we would expect to randomly find 4 yen purchases out of 33 
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such transactions associated with moderating yen depreciations.  Instead, the actual 
numbers of successes in both cases (30 and 8, respectively) are significantly greater than 
the anticipated amounts.  Japanese intervention had value as a forecast that yen 
movements would moderate on the day of the intervention relative to their movements on 
the previous day.   
We would randomly expect 46 of the 182 official Japanese sales of yen to be 
contemporaneously associated with a change from a yen appreciation to a yen 
depreciation.  The actual number in our sample is 55, which is significantly greater than 
the anticipated amount.  Under the corresponding criteria for yen purchases, the actual 
number of success (9) exceeds the expected number (8), but the difference is not 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval.   
Because the number of coordinated interventions—18 yen sales and 4 yen 
purchases—in our sample is small, we are unable to derive strong inferences about the 
importance of joint activities.  In all but one case, the p-value suggests rejecting the null 
hypothesis, but the actual number of successes almost always exceeds the expected 
number.   
Similarly, over the entire sample, for both unilateral and coordinated 
interventions, the actual number of successes under the “general” success criteria always 
exceeds the expected number.  The difference, however, is not great enough to reject the 
null hypothesis at the 95% confidence interval.  (A similar finding holds for a few other 
criteria in the table.) 
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5.2. Table 5 (March 19, 1991, to June 14, 1995) 
  During our first subperiod, interventions were more frequent, relatively smaller, 
and more likely to proceed in long strings than after June 14, 1995.  Before mid-1995, 
Japanese interventions—unilateral and coordinated—had value almost exclusively as a 
forecast that recent yen movements would moderate.  The sole exception involved 
coordinate purchases on yen against the criterion of fostering a faster yen appreciation.  
Because of the small sample size, we are somewhat suspicious of any inference about 
concerted interventions.  As in the full sample period, the actual number of successes 
exceeds the expected number is some other cases—including most of the general success 
criteria—but not by enough to reject the null hypothesis.  
5.3. Table 6 (June 14, 1995, to December 31, 2002) 
  The results after June 14, 1995, are dramatically different than those for the first 
subperiod.  The 44 Japanese interventions to purchase dollars, whether unilateral or 
coordinated—have forecast value with respect to all criteria except moderating 
movements.  Of the 44 official Japanese purchase of dollars 33 are associated with a 
dollar appreciation, and of these 33, 22 are associated with a change in the direction of 
the yen’s movement and 11 are associated with accentuating a yen appreciation.  The 
confidence level associated with these findings exceeds 95% in all cases.  The success of 
the 6 Japanese purchases of yen over this period is much more limited.  They only have 
value as a forecast that a yen appreciation will continue.   
  During this second subperiod, Japan coordinated very few of its interventions 
with the United States, so it is difficult to make much of our results for coordinated 
interventions.  This is particularly true for the single coordinate purchase of yen.  
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Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the general description of official Japanese 
interventions over this period.   
6.  Predicting Success   
  The frequencies presented in tables 4, 5, and 6 correspond to unconditional 
probabilities of success.  In this section, we show that Japanese monetary authorities can 
increase their success rate by undertaking very large, infrequent interventions.   
  Because we do not know which of the individual success criteria (1 through 8) 
Japanese monetary authorities maintained at specific times over our sample period, we 
designed the general success criteria (9 and 10) to incorporate all of the others.  The 
virtual success counts in table 4, suggest that random Japanese sales and purchases of yen 
should be successful in terms of the general criteria 61.5% and 60.8% of the time, 
respectively.  Although the actual interventions show a slightly higher frequency of 
success in both cases—65.4% for yen sales and 69.7% for yen purchases—we cannot 
reject the null of no forecast value at a 95% confidence level in either case.   
  The techniques that Japan employs for specific interventions could increase the 
prospects for success.  Large interventions, for example, might indicate a high degree of 
confidence among monetary authorities and may be more closely associated with success 
than small or medium sized transactions.  Similarly, a coordinated intervention could 
imply that U.S. monetary authorities concur with Japan’s outlook for the yen.  If so, 
Japanese interventions undertaken in concert with the United States could demonstrate a 
higher frequency of success than unilateral interventions.  Likewise, the first intervention 
in a consecutive series of transactions may be more closely associated with success than 
subsequent interventions.  If monetary authorities do not realize their near-term 
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expectation about exchange rates on the day that they initially take a position in the 
market, their chances for success may not improve with subsequent interventions.  Their 
initial failure may indicate that they are misreading market conditions.  
  Similarly, if monetary conditions change while Japan intervenes, the transactions 
may appear to be successful when, in fact, the exchange rate is adjusting to monetary 
policy.  We, therefore, control for changes in the overnight call-money rate and the 
official Japanese discount rate.   
  We analyzed the ability of these influences, and others, to predict the likelihood 
of a successful intervention in probit regression models.  As table 4 indicates, of the total 
215 interventions, 142 were successful under the general success criteria, and the 
remaining 73 were unsuccessful.  The bivariate independent variable in the probit 
regressions equals 1 if an intervention is successful under the general success criteria and 
0 otherwise.  The dependent variables are:  
a)  a dummy variable that takes a value of one after June 15, 1995 (SAMPLE2);   
b)  the absolute-value amount of an intervention in billions of yen;   
c)  a dummy variable that equals one if a Japanese intervention is coordinated 
with the United States;   
d)  a dummy variable that equals one when intervention occurs after a hiatus of at 
least four business days; 
e)  the percentage-point change in the overnight call-money interest rate;  
f)  the percentage point change in the official Japanese discount rate, and 
g)  a dummy variable for the first business day in a week.   
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We configured the changes in the two interest rates to correspond with the direction of 
the interventions.  For Japanese purchases (sales) of dollars, we enter either the 
percentage point decline (increase) in an interest rate or zero on the belief that only 
corresponding changes would contribute to success.   
Table 7 presents the results of regressing the bivariate dependent variable for 
success on each of the dependent variables individually.  T-statistics appear in 
parentheses under the relevant coefficient, and the likelihood-ratio tests for adding an 
individual regressor to the constant term appear in the last column of table 7.  The 95% 
chi-square critical value for one degree of freedom is 3.84.   
The results suggest—as did our comparison of tables 5 and 6—that interventions 
after June 14, 1995, were highly successful (SAMPLE2).  Beyond that, however, the 
probit regressions suggest that only two variables significantly influence the probability 
of success—the amount of intervention and whether the intervention occurred first in a 
sequence of transactions.  The other variables were not statistically significant.   
  To estimate the probability of success, we combined the amount-of-intervention 
term and the dummy for an initial intervention in a single probit regression, but these two 
dependent variables appeared to be collinear, yielding inefficient estimates.  To break the 
collinearity, we split the amount of intervention into: (1) the amount of an initial 
intervention (Af) and (2) the amount of a subsequent intervention (As).  Once we made 
these adjustments, the SAMPLE2 dummy had no explanatory power, suggesting that this 
term is collinear with the Af and As terms.  Indeed, interventions after June 14, 1995, were 
larger and less frequent.  We, therefore, dropped the SAMPLE2 dummy.   
This experiment produced the following result:  
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11)  I = 0.227 + 0.004 Af + 0.001 As     
   (2.156)  (2.234)  (1.307)   
where I is the unobservable probit and where t-statistics appear under the appropriate 
regressors.  The likelihood ratio test for the significance Af and As against just the 
constant is 17.63, which is significant at the 5% level.  In table 8, we evaluated equation 
11 at various values of Af and, separately, at the median value of As to derive conditional 
probabilities of success.  (Note, however, that the coefficient on As is insignificant, so 
strictly speaking the probability that a subsequent interventions will be successful is 
indistinguishable from zero.)   
  Table 8 shows that the probability of success increases with the amounts of an 
initial intervention (Af).  The median amount of an initial Japanese intervention was 
Ұ58.0 billion, which is substantially larger than the overall median amount of a Japanese 
intervention (Ұ29 billion).  An initial intervention at the median had only a 45.6% 
probability of success.  This is substantially below the observed frequency of success 
under the general success criteria, 66% and substantially below the observed frequency of 
virtual successes under this same criterion, 61%.  The largest 25% of the initial 
interventions centered around Ұ429.0 billion.  An initial intervention of this magnitude 
had a 96.3% probability of success.  The smallest 25% of the initial interventions 
centered around Ұ21.8 billion and had a 38.4% probability of success.  The probit results 
suggest that to achieve a probability of success greater than either the observed or virtual 
success frequencies, Japanese monetary authorities had to undertake an initial 
intervention of approximately Ұ160 billion.  Over our sample period, 22 of the 59 initial 
Japanese interventions exceeded Ұ160 billion.   
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7. Summary and Discussion 
  A change to fewer, but larger transactions after June 14, 1995, improved the 
effectiveness of official Japanese exchange-market interventions.  Prior to June 15, 1995, 
Japanese interventions only had value as a forecast that the previous day’s yen 
appreciation or depreciation would moderate during the current day.  Over that time 
period, official Japanese purchases and sales of yen were not associated with yen 
appreciation or depreciation, even if the yen had done so on the day before the 
intervention.  After June 14, 1995, official sales of yen had value as a forecast that the 
yen would appreciate, even if it had depreciated the day before the intervention.  Official 
purchases of yen had a very low success rate, but there were only 6 such transactions 
after June 15, 1995.   
  Intervention in the second period was generally larger and less frequent than in 
the first period.  Using probit regressions, we confirmed that large, initial interventions 
had a higher likelihood of being successful than small interventions occurring in 
persistent strings.   
  These findings are similar to those reported in Ito (2002), the first paper to use 
official Japanese data.  His data set runs from 1991 through 2000.  Ito conducts some 
similar success counts, but he does not undertake a statistical analysis of the counts.  He 
also analyzes the data using regressions with GARCH error structures.  Ito attributes the 
switch in effectiveness after June 1995 to a change in intervention tactics—larger, less 
frequent operations—following the appointment of Dr. Sakakibara as Director General of 
MoF’s International Finance Bureau.   
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  An earlier paper by Ramaswamy and Samiei (2002) uses information collected 
from the financial press to identify the timing of Japanese intervention operations from 
1995 through 1999.  In the context of an interest rate differential model of exchange-rate 
determination, they conclude that intervention operations conducted by Japan alone had a 
small but persistent impact about 50% of the time.  Our overall success rate under the 
general criterion (66%) was somewhat higher, but these results are not strictly 
comparable.   
  Fatum and Hutchinson (2003) apply an event study to analyze the MoF’s 
intervention data.   They separate the intervention activity over the period into 43 
intervention episodes and study exchange-rate movements in subsequent windows of up 
to 15 days after the end of each episode.  They conclude that intervention operations over 
the period showed some effectiveness in altering the path of dollar-yen exchange rates.   
  These studies and others typically find that concerted actions increase the 
effectiveness of intervention.  We typically found that coordinated interventions had a 
slightly higher than expected success rate.  We hesitate to draw strong conclusions, 
however, because of the small number of coordinated interventions in our sample.  
Coordinated interventions, nevertheless, tended to be isolated events; they rarely occurred 
in strings.  Moreover coordinated interventions were substantially larger that unilateral 
Japanese interventions.  We show that large and isolated Japanese interventions generally 
have higher rates of success.   
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Endnotes
 
1  See Bonser-Neal, et.al. (1998) and Humpage (1999).   
2  See Ito’s (2002) discussion of sterilization in Japan.   
3  For a discussion of intervention strategies similar to our criteria, see Minutes of the 
Federal Open Market Committee, July 17, 1973, p. 19 and pp. 30–31.   
4  Official actions that are consistently wrong can also convey useful information to the 
market.  Neely and Weller (1997) and LeBaron (1999) found that profitable technical 
trading rules often recommend trading against the Federal Reserve System’s 
interventions. 
   21
Tables 
TABLE 1:  INTERVENTION STATISTICS AND COUNTS      
        Full Sample:  March 19, 1991 to December 31, 2002; 2971 observations   
            
            
            
   Count Average Median St.  Dev.  Max    Min 
           
Japan interventions         (in billions of yen)    
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  33  ¥148  ¥29  ¥462  ¥2620  ¥3 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  182  156  51  258  1406  5 
  Total  (absolute value)   215  155  49  297  2620  3 
  No interventions  2756        
           
Japan interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  33  $1,145  $223  $3,593  $20,366  $25 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  182  1450  504  2302  13207  45 
  Total  (absolute value)   215  1404  493  2534  20366  25 
  No interventions  2756        
           
U.S. interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  4  $258  $75  $384  $833  $50 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  18  408  372  188  800  165 
  Total    22  381  352  230  833  50 
  No  interventions  2949        
           
Japan coordinated interventions        (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  4  $610  $349  $762  $1,691  $51 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  18  1102  657  1618  7426  160 
  Total    22  1013  622  1496  7426  51 
 No  interventions  2949        
          
Combined interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  4  $868  $424  $1,129  $2,524  $101 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  18  1510  1051  1675  7926  325 
  Total    22  1393  1002  1587  7926  101 
 No  interventions  2949        
            
            
NOTE: The first Japanese intervention in our data occurs on May 13, 1991 .    
NOTE: All U.S. interventions were coordinated.      
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TABLE 2:  INTERVENTION STATISTICS AND COUNTS      
        Subperiod:  March 19, 1991 to June 14, 1995; 1069 observations    
            
            
            
   Count Average Median St.  Dev.  Max    Min 
           
Japan interventions         (in billions of yen)    
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  27  ¥29  ¥21  ¥20  ¥77  ¥3 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  138  51  39  45  339  5 
  Total  (absolute value)   165  47  37  43  339  3 
  No interventions  904        
           
Japan interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  27  $223  $151  $155  $598  $25 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  138  514  388  490  3917  45 
  Total  (absolute value)   165  467  350  465  3917  25 
  No interventions  904        
           
U.S. interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  3  $67  $50  $29  $100  $50 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  15  414  374  202  800  165 
  Total  (absolute value)   18  356  335  227  800  50 
  No interventions  1051        
           
Japan coordinated interventions        (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  3  $249  $99  $303  $598  $51 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  15  750  645  384  1457  160 
  Total    18  666  552  412  1457  51 
 No  interventions  1051        
          
Combined interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  3  $316  $199  $292  $648  $101 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  15  1164  1100  532  2207  325 
  Total    18  1023  926  591  2207  101 
 No  interventions  1051        
            
            
NOTE: The first Japanese intervention in our data occurs on May 13, 1991 .    
NOTE: All U.S. interventions were coordinated.      
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TABLE 3:  INTERVENTION STATISTICS AND COUNTS      
        Subperiod: June 15, 1995 to December 31,  2002; 1902 observations   
            
            
            
   Count Average Median St.  Dev.  Max    Min 
           
Japan interventions         (in billions of yen)    
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  6  ¥684  ¥256  ¥972  ¥2620  ¥76 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  44  488  434  353  1406  43 
  Total  (absolute value)   50  512  420  297  2620  43 
  No interventions  1852        
           
Japan interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 6  $5,296  $1,948  $7,567  $20,366  $595 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  44  4386  4004  3147  13207  498 
  Total  (absolute value)   50  4495  3794  3824  20366  498 
  No interventions  1852        
           
U.S. interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  1  $833  $833  $0  $833  $833 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  3  378  333  107  500  300 
  Total  (absolute value)   4  492  417  244  833  300 
  No interventions  1898        
           
Japan coordinated interventions        (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 1  $1,691  $1,691  $0  $1,691  $1,691 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  3  2864  668  3952  7426  498 
  Total    4  2571  622  3280  7426  498 
 No  interventions  1898        
          
Combined interventions       (in millions of dollars)   
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 1  $2,524  $2,524  $0  $2,524  $2,524 
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  3  3242  1001  4058  7926  798 
  Total    4  3062  1762  3333  7926  798 
 No  interventions  1898        
            
            
NOTE: All U.S. interventions were coordinated.      
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TABLE 4:  THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS           
                March 19, 1991 to December 31, 2002; 2971 observations       
                
                
      Interventions            Virtual  Expected   Standard  P-Value 
    Total       Successes      Successes  Successes  Deviation  1-CDF 
   #  #  %  #  %  #  #   
Japan               
Appreciation / Depreciation               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  182 87 47.8  1437  48.4 88.0  6.5  0.532 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  33 15 45.5  1492  50.2 16.6  2.9  0.646 
                
Change Direction               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 182  55  30.2  749  25.2 45.9  5.7  0.047 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 33  9  27.3  757  25.5 8.4  2.5  0.321 
                
Moderate movements               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 182  30  16.5  307  10.3 18.8  4.0  0.003 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 33  8  24.2  364  12.3 4.0  1.9  0.015 
                
Accentuate movements               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 182  20  11.0  351  11.8 21.5  4.2  0.584 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 33  6  18.2  354  11.9 3.9  1.9  0.089 
                 
General success                
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  182 119 65.4  1822  61.3 111.6  6.4  0.107 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  33 23 69.7  1817  61.2 20.2  2.8  0.115 
                
COORDINATED with USA                
Appreciation / Depreciation              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  18 10 55.6  1437  48.4 8.7  2.1  0.198 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  4 2  50.0  1492  50.2 2.0  1.0  0.316 
                
Change Direction               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 18  6  33.3  749  25.2 4.5  1.8  0.143 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 4  0  0.0  757  25.5 1.0  0.9  0.692 
                
Moderate movements               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 18  3  16.7  307  10.3 1.9  1.3  0.107 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 4  1  25.0  364  12.3 0.5  0.7  0.076 
                 
Accentuate movements                
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 18  3  16.7  351  11.8 2.1  1.4  0.155 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 4  2  50.0  354  11.9 0.5  0.6  0.006 
                 
General success                
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  18 13 72.2  1822  61.3 11.0  2.1  0.114 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  4 3  75.0  1817  61.2 2.4  1.0  0.140 
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TABLE 5:  THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS           
                March 19, 1991 to June 14, 1995; 1069 observations         
                
                
      Interventions            Virtual  Expected   Standard  P-Value 
    Total       Successes      Successes  Successes  Deviation  1-CDF 
   #  #  %  #  %  #  #   
Japan               
Appreciation / Depreciation               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 138  54  39.1  512  47.9 66.1  5.5  0.983 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 27  12  44.4  539  50.4 13.6  2.6  0.668 
               
Change Direction              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 138  33  23.9  274  25.6 35.4  4.8  0.648 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 27  8  29.6  277  25.9 7.0  2.2  0.246 
               
Moderate movements              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 138  26  18.8  121  11.3 15.6  3.5  0.002 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 27  7  25.9  111  10.4 2.8  1.6  0.004 
                
Accentuate movements               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 138  9  6.5 117  10.9 15.1  3.4  0.955 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 27  4  14.8  131  12.3 3.3  1.7  0.228 
                
General success               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 138  82  59.4  643  60.1 83.0  5.4  0.539 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 27  19  70.4  656  61.4 16.6  2.5  0.119 
                
COORDINATED with USA                
Appreciation / Depreciation              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 15  7  46.7  512  47.9 7.2  1.9  0.434 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 3  1  33.3  539  50.4 1.5  0.9  0.506 
               
Change Direction              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 15  4  26.7  274  25.6 3.8  1.7  0.334 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 3  0  0.0  277  25.9 0.8  0.8  0.594 
               
Moderate movements              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 15  3  20.0  121  11.3 1.7  1.2  0.079 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 3  1  33.3  111  10.4 0.3  0.5  0.030 
                
Accentuate movements               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 15  2  13.3  117  10.9 1.6  1.2  0.221 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 3  1  33.3  131  12.3 0.4  0.6  0.041 
                
General success               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 15  10  66.7  643  60.1 9.0  1.9  0.219 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 3  2  66.7  656  61.4 1.8  0.8  0.231 
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TABLE 6:  THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS           
                June 15, 1995 to December 31, 2002; 1902 observations       
                
                
      Interventions            Virtual  Expected   Standard  P-Value 
    Total       Successes      Successes  Successes  Deviation  1-CDF 
   #  #  %  #  %  #  #   
Japan               
Appreciation / Depreciation               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 44  33  75.0  980  51.5 22.7  3.3  0.000 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 6  3  50.0  898  47.2 2.8  1.2  0.293 
               
Change Direction              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 44  22  50.0  475  25.0 11.0  2.8  0.000 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 6  1  16.7  480  25.2 1.5  1.1  0.472 
               
Moderate movements              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 44  4  9.1  186  9.8 4.3  1.9 0.434 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 6  1  16.7  253  13.3 0.8  0.8  0.184 
                
Accentuate movements               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 44  11  25.0  234  12.3 5.4  2.2  0.005 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 6  2  33.3  223  11.7 0.7  0.8  0.024 
                
General success               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  44 37 84.1  1179  62.0 27.3  3.2  0.000 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  6 4  66.7  1161  61.0 3.7  1.2  0.249 
                
COORDINATED with USA                
Appreciation / Depreciation              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 3  3  100.0  980  51.5 1.5  0.9  0.000 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 1  1  100.0  898  47.2 0.5  0.5  0.000 
               
Change Direction              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 3  2  66.7  475  25.0 0.7  0.7  0.016 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 1  0  0.0  480  25.2 0.3  0.4  0.252 
               
Moderate movements              
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 3  0  0.0  186  9.8 0.3  0.5 0.266 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 1  0  0.0  253  13.3 0.1  0.3  0.133 
                
Accentuate movements               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold 3  1  33.3  234  12.3 0.4  0.6  0.042 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold 1  1  100.0  223  11.7 0.1  0.3  0.000 
                
General success               
  Dollars purchased, yen sold  3 3  100.0  1179  62.0 1.9  0.8  0.000 
  Yen purchased, dollars sold  1 1  100.0  1161  61.0 0.6  0.5  0.000 
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Table 7: Individual Factors in Probit Regressions       
        
  Constant Coefficient Log    Likelihood 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES   t-Statistic  t-Statistic Likelihood Ratio  Test 
   Constant only  0.414    -137.76  
  4.692      
   SAMPLE2 (dummy)  0.285 0.631  -133.75 8.00 
  2.877 2.747    
   Amount of intervention (abs.value)  0.229 0.002  -132.28 10.94 
 2.163  2.699    
   Coordinated with USA (dummy)  0.393 0.212  -137.50 0.50 
  4.236 0.704    
   First intervention in a series (dummy)  0.293 0.478  -135.05 5.41 
 2.878  2.289     
   Call-money rate change (perc.points)  0.442 2.051  -136.88 1.74 
 4.855  1.295     
    Discount rate change (perc.points)  0.420 0.859  -137.57 0.38 
 4.728  0.605     
    First busines day  (dummy)  0.393 0.096  -137.65 0.20 
 3.936  0.450    
        
Note:  Official interest rate increases (decreases) correspond to official yen purchases (sales). 
          Chi-Square critical value for 95% confidence level with 1 degree of freedom in 3.84.     
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TABLE 8:  CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS 
  
First Interventions Amounts:  Probability 
    Y 21.8 billion  (lower 25%)  0.384 
    Y 57.9 billion  (median)   0.456 
    Y 429.0 billion  (upper 25%)   0.963 
Subsequent Interventions:  0.357 
   
Unconditional Probability     
           of a General Success:      0.660 
   























FIGURE 1: INTERVENTION AND YEN DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE
Japanese & U.S. intervention 
(in millions of dollars)
Millions of dollars 
Exchange rate
Japanese yen per U.S. dollar
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